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Abstract- In this paper we investigate the Mexican real estate 
market, especially the economy class homes. This sector plays an 
important role for Mexican social stability. We investigate the 
Cournot and Stackelberg mixed duopoly models where a state­
owned public firm maximizing domestic social surplus, and a 
foreign firm searching to maximize its own profit, compete. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The crediting system has a crucial role for the society in 
Mexico due to many reasons. Some of them are: the deficit of 
the apartments in the renting market (at present, around 6 
millions of new homes/apartments are necessary to satisfy 
naturally existed demand). 
Next, the problem of poverty is still very important to 
Mexico, as around 50% of it population have monthly incomes 
below 3000-4000 pesos. Being quite a vulnerable part of the 
society they are strongly dependent on the state-owned projects 
of the construction and fmancing the real estate. 
One of the most important one is INFONA VIT. Every 
officially working citizen has a saving account, to where the 
part of paid tax is being transferred. And when the person 
wants to buy a real estate, he can use this money and he will 
obtain the credit line for the rest of the home's value. 
As well, the organization giving the credit obtains 
governmental guaranties in case of a default. 
The computational game theoretic modeling tool for model 
runs offered in this paper is composed as a mixed 
complementarity problem (MCP). 
Numerical experiments are programmed in computing 
language GAMS. 
At the present time, the mortgage system (both private and 
public sectors) is offering changing and fixed interest rates. 
Fixed rates are around 9-11 % and special rates are about 4-6%, 
but being calculated on the base of minimal salaries. Which 
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mean, the relation of the minimal wage increments to a real 
inflation rate in Mexico is crucial. 
Indeed, if the salary increased less then actual inflation rate, 
the credit giving bank counts a loss in real money value. 
Otherwise, if the minimum salaries grow faster then the 
inflation, the bank counts an increase of the actual credit value. 
During last years, we have an increase of the minimal 
salary stronger then annual inflation rate. 
So, even presented as being lower, the special rates, where 
the risk of inflation covered by credit payer (the debt is counted 
in minimal salaries) in real terms does not differ from fixed 
rates. 
II. FORMULATION OF THE MODEL AND COURNOT-NASH 
EQUILIBRIUM. 
The interest in mixed oligopolies is high because of their 
importance in economies worldwide (see [3]) for analysis of 
"herd behavior" by private firms in many branches of the 
economy in Japan. 
There are examples of mixed oligopolies in United States 
such as the packaging and overnight-delivery industries. Mixed 
oligopolies are also common in the East European and former 
Soviet Union transitional economies, in which competition 
among public and private firms existed or still exists in many 
industries such as banking, house loan, airline, 
telecommunication, natural gas, electric power, hospital, health 
care, railways and others. 
The A mathematically extended version of applied model is 
introduced by Kalashnikov et al. [7]. 
Consider two firms producing a homogeneous product. Let 
represent the total G credit output, and p( G) denote an 
inverse demand function, i.e. the interest rate consumer has to 
pay. The electricity produced by the two firms is sold at the 
domestic market. In this paper, we will not consider 
international trade. 
Let q;,t i=1,2, t=l, . . .  ,n, denote the output of fIrm using 
the capital source t. 
Without affecting generality, we assume both private and 
public fIrms have same list of sources. At last, let c;,dq;,t) 
stand for the production cost by fIrm for the technology t. As 
is the total output, one has 
n 
G = L(q1,t +q2,t) (1). t=1 
Firm 1 is a foreign private fIrm, which maximizes its own 
profIts, and fIrm 2 is a domestic public fIrm that maximizes 
domestic social surplus. Domestic social surplus is the sum of 
consumer surplus and profIts of fIrm 2, and is given by: 
G 
SGq = f .. xdx-- ,� J-f _ 
o 
tie �q,/ + � q2/. 1 1= , 
here, of course 
n n 
q2 = Lq2,pq1 = Lq1,pq1 =G-q2 t=1 t=1 
The profIt of fIrm 1 is given by: 
n 
II(G,q1) = P(G)q1,t - LC1,dq1,t) t=1 
(2) 
(3). 
Now we are in a position to defme kinds of equilibrium 
states and compare the equilibrium volumes for various 
scenarios. First we consider the classical Cournot equilibrium, 
i.e., a vector 
2 
such that: 
(4) 
q,/ � n <fJ,/ == c�/ q,/. -q,/p: G. - l! G. (5) 
� 0, ql,t<fJl,t = 0 Vt 
q > m = c' q + G -q p' G 2/ - n .." 2/ - 2/ 2/ ' 
• 
2/'" (6) 
-,J G � 0 q 1<fJ 1 = 0 Vt ........ , 2, 2, , 
Problem (4}-(6) is a standard complementarity 
problem.Therefore, applying analogous methods as in 
Kalashnikov et al. [7], we obtain the existence and the 
uniqueness of the equilibrium. 
III. ST ACKELBERG MODEL WITH LEADERSHIP OF DOMESTIC 
(PUBLIC) FIRM 
First, in this Section, we examine the game where fIrm 2 
(public one) is the leader. Firm 2 chooses its output volume , 
and fum 1 (private one) chooses after having observed , so as 
to maximize its net profIt 
n 
II(G,q1) = P(G)q1 - LC1,dq1,t) 
n n 
t=1 
q2 = LQ2,pq1 = LQ1,pQ1 =G-Q2' t=1 t=1 
n n 
where Q2 = LQ2,pQ1 = LQ1,pQ1 =G-Q2' t=1 t=1 
(7) 
Let Q1 = Q1 ( Q2 ) � 0 be the (optimal) reaction function of 
fIrm 1; that is, the value that satisfIes the equality: 
a 
(f) q q = - II G q q ::; 0 and "'-1 � �- a - ,.-..t �- , q, 
�.!L. q�_ ".!L. q� = 0 
(8) 
Now we are in a posItIOn to recall a mathematically 
rigorous defmition of the Stackelberg equilibrium state with the 
domestic leader and foreign follower. 
Definition 1: A Stackelberg equilibrium (with the domestic 
firm as a leader and the foreign firm as a follower) is the vector 
Z = (G, q1,11"""' q1,n' q2,11"""' q2,n) E R:n+1 such that 
GF,L = i {q�dQL )}+ QL (9) t=1 
(10) 
n 
where QL = L q�,t - total output of the domestic t=1 
n 
company and q: = L q�dQL ) - optimal response of the t=1 
private firm. The following three relationships 
G = QL + qF 1 
F ' F  F '  ql,1 �O, '1'1,1 =CI,I(ql,I)-ql,IP (G) 
- p(G) � 0, qi,I'I'I,t = 0 'Vt 
(12) 
(13) 
q\ � n 'I' I = C' J q\ + G -q\ p' G 2, 2, 2, 2, - • 2, 2/ _ .  - (14) 
-,J G � 0 q 1'1' I = 0 'Vt � , 2, 2, , 
define a complementarity problem, analogous to the one 
discussed in Kalashnikov et al. [7]. 
IV. ST ACKELBERG MODEL WITH LEADERSHIP OF FOREIGN 
(PRIVATE) FIRM 
Now consider the game where firm 1 (foreign private firm) is 
a leader. Firm 1 chooses it q 1,t' t = 1,""", n and firm 2 
(domestic or public supplier) chooses q 2,t' t = 1,""", n 
after having observed q 1,t' t = 1,""", n ,so as to maximize 
domestic social surplus 
3 
G 
S G q = f .. xdx-- ,� J-f _ 
o 
tie �q1/ + � q2/ J 1=1 
n n 
(15) 
Where q2 = Lq2,pq1 = LQ1,pq1 =G-Q2 t=1 t=1 
Definition 2: A Stackelberg equilibrium (with the foreign firm 
as a leader and the domestic firm as a follower) is the vector 
Z = (GL,F ,Qi ,Q;,dQi ),""",Q;,n(Qi )) E R:+2 such 
that 
GL,F = Q; + Q; (Q; ) 
Q; E Arg max{rr1(Q1) Q1 � o} 
Q; (QL ) = arg max{s(GL,F , Q2) Q2 � o} 
n 
(16) 
(17) 
(18) 
whereQL = L qi,t - total output of the private firm and t=1 
n 
q; = L q ;,d Q L ) - optimal response of the domestic t=1 
company. Following three sentences 
qF > A. = C' qF + G _ qF p' G 2, I - 0, '1'2,1 - -...r -u,J-..- 2, I � 
-,J G � 0 qFI<P I = 0 'Vt ........ , 2, 2, , 
(19) 
(20) 
(21) 
define a complementarity problem, analogous with one 
discussed in [7]. 
V. RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
In the above analysis, we investigated three different types 
of equilibrium in the duopoly with a private (foreign) agent 
aiming at maximization of its own profit, and a domestic firm 
maximizing domestic social surplus. After presenting the 
Cournot equilibrium in the above-described model, we 
examined two versions of Stackelberg game, with the private 
firm as a leader and domestic one as a follower, and vice versa. 
In order to compare the equilibrium volumes in various 
scenarios we introduce the concepts of a weak and a strong 
firm, in dependence on the sign of the agent's optimal reaction 
function's derivative at the Cournot equilibrium. With such a 
characteristic, it turns out that if the inverse demand function is 
convex, then the state owned market agent is always weak, and 
vice versa: if the inverse demand function is concave, then the 
domestic agent is always strong. 
For the Stackelberg equilibrium with the public owned 
agent as a leader, we obtain that the production volume by the 
leader (and hence, the total cleared market volume) is higher 
than that in the Cournot equilibrium, if the private firm (the 
follower) is strong. Otherwise, if the private agent is weak, then 
the total cleared market volume is lower with the domestic 
producer as a leader than that would be in the Cournot 
equilibrium Kalashnikov et al. [7]. 
Next, if the foreign (private) firm is a leader, then the 
relations between the leader's (and hence, the total) offered 
credit volumes directly depend upon the strength of the state 
owned credit institution as a follower: if the domestic firm is 
weak, then the leader's credit volume is higher than that would 
be in the Cournot equilibrium; otherwise, when the domestic 
firm is strong, the private leader's output (and hence the total 
cleared market volume) is lower than that in the Cournot 
equilibrium Kalashnikov et al. [7]. 
We have run numerical experiments for the classical 
Cournot-Nash model and the mixed Coumot-Nash one with a 
socially-oriented agent. For the inverse demand function, we 
have chosen the function of form (23) where we have assumed 
the market elasticity parameter to be equal to 0.9. 
4 
The socially-oriented model offers the credit rates under the 
existing rates - around 6.7%, which means that we should 
claim for more social responsibility on the part our state-owned 
mortgage funds. 
The classical model yields the equilibrium rate equal to 
9.3%, which is somewhat lower than the actually offered rates. 
This difference can be explained by our underestimation of 
non-payment risks, which is a goal of the further analysis, as 
well as numerical calculations for Stackelberg model. 
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